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REGULATION AND THE MARGINALIST REVOLUTION 
Herbert Hovenkamp* 
PRELIMINARY DRAFT: PLEASE CONSULT AUTHOR BEFORE CITING 
Abstract 
 The marginalist revolution in economics became the foundation for the modern 
regulatory State with its “mixed” economy.  Marginalism, whose development defines the 
boundary between classical political economy and neoclassical economics, completely 
overturned economists’ theory of value.  It developed in the late nineteenth century in England, 
the Continent and the United States.  For the classical political economists, value was a function 
of past averages.  One good example is the wage-fund theory, which saw the optimal rate of 
wages as a function of the firm’s ability to save from previous profits. Another is the theory of 
corporate finance, which assessed a corporation’s worth by looking at how much capital had 
been paid in. Marginalism substituted forwarded looking theories based on expectations about 
firm and market performance.  The optimal rate of wages became the laborer’s expected 
contribution to the value of the employer; and the value of the corporation became the firm’s 
anticipated profits.  Marginalism swept through university economics in the United States, and 
by 1920 or so virtually every academic economist was a marginalist. 
As a theory of value, marginalism was much more realistic than classical political 
economy about how market actors behave.  At the same time, however, valuations based on 
expectations about the future, which necessarily included risk, required both more technical 
analysis and the accommodation of more uncertainty.  These changes had a powerful effect on 
the development of modern regulatory policy in the United States. 
 Marginalism upended many of the classical conceptions about the market, including 
assumptions about their robustness, as well as the need for regulation and the optimal type.  For 
regulatory policy the most important issues were: (1) The fixed-cost controversy and the scope of 
natural monopoly; (2) cost classification, incentives, and ratemaking; (3) the changing domain of 
market failure (4) market diversity and the rise of sector regulation; (5) deregulation; (6) 
concerns about the distribution of wealth; and (6) the assessment of risk.  The final section 
examines risk management under marginalism by looking at two diverse but important areas: 
negligence and products liability in tort law, and administrative review of patents by the Patent 
Trial and Appeal Board. 
 
 
                                                          
*James G. Dinan University Professor, Univ. of Pennsylvania School of Law and The Wharton School.  A 
shorter version of this paper is intended for presentation at a program entitled “New Perspectives on U.S. 
Regulatory History: Past and Present of Public Utilities and Antitrust Law,” June 4-5, 2018, Harvard 
Business School.  Thanks to Erik Hovenkamp for commenting on portions of a draft. 
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Introduction 
 Of all the effects of the neoclassical revolution in economics, few have been more 
profound and lasting as its impact on the theory and policy of regulation. The marginalist 
revolution in economics became the foundation for the modern regulatory State with its “mixed” 
economy.    The so-called “marginal revolution,” which best identifies the dividing line between 
classical and neoclassical economics, originated in the work of William Stanley Jevons in 
England, Carl Menger in Austria, Leon Walras in Switzerland, and a little later John Bates Clark 
in the United States.1  The initial work was done in the 1860s and 1870s.  In the United States the 
dispute over marginalism led to an upheaval in the American Economic Association, which had 
been founded in 1885.2  The neoclassicists eventually won out and marginalist approaches swept 
the field.  Today every mainstream economist is some kind of marginalist. 
Formulating marginalism into what became modern price theory and industrial 
organization became the task of a second generation of marginalists -- most notably Alfred 
Marshall of Cambridge, whose Principles of Economics was published in 1890 and went through 
numerous editions.3  Marginalism completely upended classical political economy’s theory of 
value, which had largely been drawn from averages of past experience.  For example, the optimal 
rate of wages was dictated by the wage-fund doctrine, which held that the fund available for the 
payment of wages was determined by the amount of capital retained from previous production.  
This then had to be divided among the number of workers.4  If a firm’s wages exceeded this 
amount it would end up borrowing against the future, which was a road to insolvency.  An 
analytically similar classical doctrine was the theory of corporate finance that the value of a 
corporation equaled the amount of capital that had been paid into the corporation.5  The 
marginalist critique of these doctrines observed that they had little to do with actual market 
behavior.  The wage that an employer is willing to pay is not based on the amount in some 
historical fund, but on the employer’s expectations about how much value the employee will 
contribute to the firm.6  Equally, the value of a corporation is not a function of the amount of 
capital that has been paid in, but rather the firm’s prospects for the future.  As one early twentieth 
century treatise on corporate finance observed concerning the change, “there is very seldom even 
a close correspondence between the original investment of capital and the value of a 
                                                          
1See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW: NEOCLASSICAL THOUGHT, 1870-1970 at 
27-32 (2015); MARK BLAUG, ECONOMIC THEORY IN RETROSPECT 277-310 (3d ed. 1997).  See WILLIAM 
STANLEY JEVONS, THEORY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (1871); CARL MENGER, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 
(1871); LEON WALRAS, ELEMENTS OF PURE ECONOMICS (1874); JOHN BATES CLARK, THE 
DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH: A THEORY OF WAGES, INTERESTS AND PROFITS (1899). 
2See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note __ at 75-76. 
3ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (1890). 
4HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937 at 193-198 (1991). 
5HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note __, 159-171. 
6E.g., CLARK, DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH, supra note __ (developing marginal productivity theory of 
wages). 
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corporation’s assets.”7  These changes in economics’ methodology of evaluation reflected the 
general rule of marginalism that value is based on a maximizing actor’s willingness to pay or to 
accept for a given good or opportunity.  While the classical theory of value looked backward, the 
marginalist theory looked forward. 
 Marginalism upended many of the classical conceptions about the market and, in the 
process, about the need for regulation and the optimal type.  For regulatory policy the most 
important issues were: (1) The fixed-cost controversy and the scope of natural monopoly; (2) 
cost classification, incentives, and ratemaking; (3) the changing domain of market failure (4) 
market diversity and the rise of sector regulation; (5) deregulation; (6) concerns about the 
distribution of wealth; and (6) the assessment of risk. 
 The marginalist revolution in economics made modern, sector-specific agency regulation 
inevitable, at least within the framework that marginalist economics chose.8  To be sure, the 
development of regulatory agencies is historically contingent. One can also imagine a world in 
which we have fewer of them, or their jurisdictional boundaries over subject matter or geography 
differ from the arrangements that we have. The fact is, however, that the complexity of issues 
created by marginalism, including accounting for risk and distributional concerns, made them 
essential nonetheless.  It is one thing to roll back the clock on regulation; it is quite another to 
roll it back on marginalism itself. 
 One of marginalism’s most threatening aspects was that it imposed a significant measure 
of subjective choice into policy making.  The conception of markets in nineteenth century 
political economy was that they were an objective part of the laws of nature.  Classical political 
economists sometimes spoke of the laws of the economy as a part of natural law.9  A popular 
nineteenth century American text initially written by Brown University’s Francis Wayland and 
later co-authored with Aaron Chapin declared that: 
Political Economy is that branch of Social Science which treats the production and 
application of wealth to the well-being of men in society. It is a branch of true science….  
By Science, as the word is here used, we mean a Systematic arrangement of the laws 
which God has established, so far as they have been discovered, of any department of 
human knowledge.10 
Marginalism and the resulting regulation were stunningly different from this conception 
of economic science.  Nearly every decision to regulate leads to a menu of policy choices.  
Different jurisdictions make different choices, and it is not always clear that one works better 
than another.  Further, different approaches may work better in different environments.  
Regulation often invites experimentation and necessarily criticism about the amount or the 
particular direction regulation has taken. This rhetoric continues to appear in the debate between 
                                                          
7WILLIAM HENRY LOUGH AND FREDERICK WILLIAM FIELD, CORPORATION FINANCE: AN EXPOSITION OF 
THE PRINCIPLES AND METHODS GOVERNING THE PROMOTION, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OF 
MODERN CORPORATIONS 125, 127, 128, 130-131 (1909; 7th ed. 1916). 
8 See discussion infra, text at notes __. 
9E.g., HENRY WOOD, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NATURAL LAW 18-19 (1894). 
10FRANCIS WAYLAND, THE ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 348 (recast by Aaron L. Chapin, 1886). 
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the advocates for regulation and its detractors.  Just to give one example, the perceived need for 
regulation of the business corporation and its shareholders or creditors began to loom large 
during the Gilded Age, particularly in the “watered stock” scandals.  The regulatory experiments 
that resulted included state “blue sky” laws,11 and in the federal government the U.S. Industrial 
Commission (1898-1902), the Federal Bureau of Corporations (1903-1915), and eventually the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
 Also inherent in marginalism’s emphasis on expected value was greatly increased use of 
mathematics.  As a result, the initial division between traditionalists and marginalists was 
generational.  Older economists lacked the training in mathematics that the new economics 
required, and they naturally resisted it.12  The models that marginalist economists developed took 
expected value and risk into account.  Because pricing decisions are made at the margin, 
neoclassical economics provided a technical basis for dividing the behavior of markets or firms 
into shorter or longer “runs” or time periods.  It produced technical cost classifications into long-
run and short-run costs, including the development of the marginal cost curve, perhaps the most 
distinctive mathematical feature of marginalism.  The marginal revenue curve came a generation 
later.13 
Closely related was increased attention to the theory of competition, and increasing 
awareness that “perfect” competition is the exception rather than the rule.  Rather, competition 
exists in degrees, depending mainly on the number of firms and the types of costs that each firm 
faces.14  The full implications had to await the early 1930s and the work of Robinson and 
Chamberlin on imperfect and monopolistic competition.15  Joseph Schumpeter had the 
prescience to see this in the mid-thirties, in a review of Joan Robinson’s Economics of Imperfect 
Competition.16  Prior to that time economists had treated competition and monopoly as the only 
market structures worth systematic examination, and everything in between as “an academic 
curiosity.”  However, if this intermediate range should emerge as dominant then the traditional 
laissez faire assumption that markets should be left alone could cease to hold true.  Instead, the 
                                                          
11See, e.g., William W. Cook, "Watered Stock" -- Commissions -- "Blue Sky Laws" -- Stock Without Par 
Value, 19 MICH. L. REV. 583, 584 (1921) (prominent Gilded Age corporate law treatise author advocating 
state blue sky statutes). See also LOUIS LOSS & EDWARD M. COWETT, BLUE SKY LAWS (1958); Paul G. 
Mahoney, The Origins of the Blue-Sky Laws: A Test of Competing Hypotheses, 46 J. L. ECON. 229, 230-
232 (2003). 
12HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note __ at 75-76. 
13The construction of the marginal revenue curve is generally attributed to Joan Robinson, occasionally 
with Edward H. Chamberlin as an independent discoverer.  See Alfred S. Eichner, Joan Robinson’s 
Legacy, 27 CHALLENGE 42 (1984). See JOAN ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION 
182-196 (1933; 2d ed. 1969); EDWARD H. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 
178-193 (1933). 
14George J. Stigler, Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated, 65 J. Pol. Econ. 1 (1957). 
15ROBINSON, supra; CHAMBERLIN, supra. 
16Joseph A. Schumpeter & A.J. Nichol, Robinson’s Economics of Imperfect Competition, 42 J. POL. ECON. 
249, 250–251 (1934). 
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circumstances under which governmental action could increase welfare “becomes so extended as 
to make these cases the rule rather than more or less curious exceptions.”17 
Inextricably related was the concept of uncertainty – and relatedly, risk – which developed 
naturally out of theories that identified value with future expectations rather than past averages.18  
A good example is the revolution in corporate finance.19  Under the classical theory any judge 
who knew a little arithmetic and basic concepts of property valuation could decide whether stock 
was “watered,” which meant that its stated par value exceeded the actual value historically paid 
in.20  Answering that question required a judge to determine the amount of paid in cash and 
noncash capital and divide by the number of shares.  The biggest problem was overstatement of 
the value of noncash property.21  But the marginalist theory that a firm’s value is a function of 
anticipated profitability was far more complex, requiring considerable information about the firm 
itself and its products and management, the market in which the firm operated, and the valuation 
of uncertain future events. 
 The initial effect of marginalism was to weaken the classical view that nearly all markets 
work well, and opinions about the robustness of markets differed a great deal depending on 
assumptions about such things as the distribution of fixed and variable costs, the flow of 
information, or the degree and nature of risk or uncertainty that the firm faced.  This in turn led 
increasingly to the view that markets differ from one another, and that many would work better if 
the state applied a corrective.  In other words, marginalism provided a rationale for both vastly 
increased amount of government intervention in the economy and the idea that the type of 
intervention should vary from one market to another.  As with many revisionist ideas, its early 
history reflected positions that were later thought to be extreme once marginalism became more 
normalized in economic and regulatory theory. 
Fixed Costs, Equilibrium, and Natural Monopoly 
One of the most important issues confronting neoclassical regulatory theory was determining 
the range of industries and firms to which price regulation should be applied.  Policy makers 
needed to know whether an industry equilibrium with satisfactory results could be achieved 
without state intervention. 
Among Alfred Marshall’s most significant contributions to neoclassical price theory was his 
development of partial equilibrium analysis, which examined a portion of the economy limited to 
a single “commodity” or finite time period.  Marshall realized that in an economy everything 
                                                          
17Id. at 256. 
18 The most prophetic was FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT (1921). 
19See discussion supra, text at notes __. 
20E.g., Appeal of Lehigh Ave. Rwy. Co., 499, 129 Pa. 405 (1889) (stock certificate “stands in the hands of 
the subscriber for so much as, and no more than, the amount actually paid upon it”). 
21E.g., Gillett v Chicago Title & Trust Co., 230 Ill 373, 82 N.E. 891, 904-05 (1907) (promoters 
contribution of an unwritten play and an unpatented invention not worth the $2 million evaluation placed 
on them.  Cf. Carr v. Le Fevre, 27 Pa. 413 (1856) (contribution of coal mining property at appraised value 
permitted, given that there was no evidence suggesting that the appraisal was fraudulent). 
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affects everything else.  Nevertheless, he argued forcefully for the importance of studying a 
specific product, assuming that changes in demand and supply for that product had no effect on 
other goods.  In defending this approach he wrote: 
“The forces to be dealt with are, however, so numerous that it is best to analyse a few at a 
time and to work out a number of partial solutions as auxiliaries to our main study. Thus we 
begin by isolating the primary relations of supply, demand and price in regard to a particular 
commodity. We reduce to inaction all other forces by the phrase ‘other things being equal’. 
We do not suppose that they are inert, but for the time we ignore their activity. This scientific 
device is a great deal older than science; it is the method by which consciously or 
unconsciously sensible men dealt from time immemorial with every difficult problem of 
everyday life.22   
Famously, however, Marshall was unable to get an equilibrium in a competitive market if the 
firms in it experienced significant fixed costs.23  Competition would drive prices to marginal 
cost, which covers only variable costs.  The firms in such a market would be forced to charge 
prices so low that they could not stay in business. 
 One result of Marshall’s dilemma was that economists became embroiled in a significant 
“fixed cost” controversy, in which economists and lawyers debated both the meaning and the 
policy implications of high fixed costs.24  In antirust for example, firms argued that in industries 
with high fixed costs competition would be “ruinous,” forcing firms out of business until only a 
monopolist survived.  Otherwise they would be forced to collude or merge.25  The economics 
literature produced many studies involving long- vs. short-period sales, the availability of price 
discrimination, or other theories attempting to explain how fixed costs could be consistent with 
stable competition.26 
The policy responses were less extreme than the literature.  First, the Supreme Court 
consistently rejected “ruinous competition” as a defense in antitrust cases.27  The principal 
example of an industry that came under price regulation as a result of the controversy was the 
railroads, where fixed costs were so high that they were thought to create natural monopolies 
across a wide range of situations.  The issue was also raised in the cast-iron pipe price fixing 
case, but both the Sixth Circuit in Judge Taft’s well-known opinion and the Supreme Court 
                                                          
22ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS, preface, xiii (8th ed. 1920). 
23See, e.g., Renee Prendergast, Increasing Returns and Competitive Equilibrium – the Content and 
Development of Marshall’s Theory, 16 CAMB. J. ECON. 238 (1992). 
24For an account of the debate in the United States and its affect on developing antitrust policy, see 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE, supra note __ at 308-322. 
25See, e.g., Eliot Jones, Is Competition in Industry Ruinous, 34 Q.J. ECON. 473 (1920) (summarizing the 
theory of the day). 
26E.g., JOHN M. CLARK, STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF OVERHEAD COSTS (1923); Spurgeon Bell, Fixed 
Costs and Market Price, 32 Q.J. ECON. 507, 509–22 (1918); Frank H. Knight, Cost of Production and Price 
over Long and Short Periods, 29 J. POL. ECON. 304, 306–10 (1921). 
27See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn., 166 U.S. 290, 329-330 (1897) (rejecting the 
defense).  Accord United States v. Joint-Traffic Assn., 171 U.S. 505, 519-523, 547-48, 569 (1898), 
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rejected it there as well.28  There is some reason for believing that the Supreme Court’s hostility 
toward cartels in high fixed cost industries either led to or exacerbated the first great American 
merger movement, in which many firms with high fixed costs were forced to merge because 
antitrust law left them unable to collude.29 
Marshall’s own solution to the fixed cost problem was widely regarded as unacceptable.  
Borrowing from biology, he reasoned that firms were like trees in a forest. The “representative 
firm” went through a finite life cycle, growing in the earlier part, maturing, and eventually 
withering away.30  As a result there would not be durable monopoly but rather ongoing cycling 
of firms.31 Marshall wrote in his Eighth edition: 
…the very conditions of an industry which enable a new firm to attain quickly command 
over new economies of production, render that firm liable to be supplanted quickly by still 
younger firms with yet newer methods.  Especially where the powerful economies of 
production on a large scale are associated with the use of new appliances and new methods, a 
firm which has lost the exceptional energy which enable it to rise is likely ere long quickly to 
decay; and the full life of a large firm seldom lasts very long.32 
This passage indicates that Marshall was aware of the role of innovation (“newer methods’) in 
upsetting equilibrium and perhaps even making the search for equilibrium less important.  But 
Marshall himself did not do down this road.33 
One weakness in his biological theory of the life of a representative firm, Marshall 
acknowledged, might be joint stock companies, or corporations, which did not necessarily go 
through this ageing cycle.  However, Marshall persisted in the view that such companies were 
inherently inferior mechanisms of production, largely because of problems relating to the 
separation of ownership and control.34 
Most of Marshall’s intellectual descendants did not follow him into this biological forest.  
Rather they looked for solutions to the fixed cost problem in two quite different places.  Both 
were driven more by the mathematics of marginalism rather than by biological analogies.  First 
                                                          
28United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 291 (6th Cir. 1898), modified and aff'd, 175 U.S. 
211 (1899) (rejecting “ruinous competition” defense). 
29E.g., NAOMI R. LAMOREAUX, THE GREAT MERGER MOVEMENT IN AMERICAN BUSINESS, 1895-1904 at 
27-33 (1998).  See also LESTER TELSER, ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE CORE 387 (1978); George 
Bittlingmayer, Did Antitrust Policy Cause the Great Merger Wave?, 28 J. L. & ECON. 77 (1985); George 
Bittlingmayer, Decreasing Average Cost: a New Look at the Addyston Pipe Case, 25 J. L. & ECON. 201 
(1982). 
30See Gerald F. Shove, The Representative Firm and Increasing Returns, 40 ECON. J. 94 (1930). 
31For a good discussion, see Neil Hart, Marshall’s Theory of Value: the Role of External Economies, 20 
CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 353, 360-362 (1996). 
32ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 239 (8th ed. 1920). 
33 That largely awaited Schumpeter.  See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND 
DEMOCRACY (1942), particularly its Chapter 7 on “The Process of Creative Destruction.” 
34Id. at 253 (shareholders generally unable “to exercise an effective and wise control over the general 
management of the business”).  See id. at 254-258 for Marshall’s highly suspicious account of 
corporations, and particularly about the rise of the “trust” in the United States. 
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was the idea that the long run average cost curve might be U-shaped rather than continuously 
downward sloping.  The second was the availability of product differentiation and, eventually, 
monopolistic competition. 
The proposition of U-shaped long run average cost is simply that scale economies do not 
produce increasing returns indefinitely. Rather at some point the curve bottoms out and either 
remains flat or begins to rise.  In that case the equilibrium number of firms in a market with fixed 
costs can be more than one, depending on the size of the market.  For example, if average fixed 
costs decline only to an output level of 1000 and market demand at that level is 10,000 units, 
then this market has room for up to 10 technically efficient firms.  This idea developed gradually 
in writings by Marshall’s successor Arthur C. Pigou, and Francis Edgeworth, Piero Sraffa, Jacob 
Viner, and others.35 Pigou in particular showed that when the supply price of the industry is 
greater than the marginal cost of a firm, that firm would expand until these costs were equalized.  
When a firm was in equilibrium, its marginal costs would equal the industry’s supply curve.  
Firms could be expected to jockey for growth by competing to reduce costs.36 
Of course, the fact that a U-shaped cost curve is possible does not mean that it explains every 
situation.  If the market is sufficiently small in relation to the availability of scale economies 
there still might be room for only one firm.  The other major development that addressed the 
equilibrium problem was the idea that firms differ from one another in geographic37 and product 
space.  The development of the idea of product differentiation, and most particularly of 
monopolistic competition theory in the 1930s, very largely ended the fixed cost controversy.38  
Under monopolistic competition firms compete primarily not by cutting price but rather by 
differentiating their product in order to appeal to specific consumer tastes.  Edward Chamberlin 
was able to show that even with easy entry and high fixed costs it was possible to have an 
equilibrium if products were differentiated.39 
The theory of monopolistic competition accomplished two things for regulatory policy.  First, 
it set people’s minds at ease that at least in the world of manufactured products rather than 
commodities, ruinous competition and collusion or merger to monopoly were not inevitable.  
                                                          
35Piero Sraffa, On the Relationships Between Cost and Quantity Produced (translated from French “Sulle 
relazioni fra costo e quantità prodotta”), 11 ANNALI DE ECONOMIA 277 (1925); Piero Sraffa, The Laws of 
Returns Under Competitive Conditions, 36 ECON. J. 535 (1926); ARTHUR C. PIGOU ECONOMICS OF 
WELFARE (3d ed. 1929); Jacob Viner, Cost Curves and Supply Curves (1931), reprinted in READINGS IN 
PRICE THEORY 23-46 (George J. Stigler and Kenneth E. Boulding, eds. 1953).  See also Jan Horst 
Keppler and Jerome Lallement, The Origins of the U-Shaped Average Cost Curve: Understanding the 
Complexities of the Modern Theory of the Firm, 38 HIST. POL. ECON. 733 (2006).  They identify the 
earliest graphic depiction in Francis Y. Edgeworth, Contribution to the Theory of Railway Rates – IV, 23 
ECON. J. 206 (1913). 
36Arthur C. Pigou, An Analysis of Supply, 38 ECON. J. 238 (1928).  See Herbert Hovenkamp, Coase, 
Institutionalism, and the Origins of Law and Economics, 86 IND. L.J. 499 (2011). 
37On differentiation in geographic space, see Harold Hotelling, Stability in Competition, 39 ECON. J. 41 
(1929). 
38 See BLAUG, supra note __, 375-379. 
39E.g., John R. Hicks, Survey of Economic Theory: The Theory of Monopoly, 3 ECONOMETRICA 1 (1935); 
Arthur Smithies, Equilibrium in Monopolistic Competition, 55 Q.J. ECON. 95 (1940). 
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Rather, this became a problem of degree.  Second, however, was the realization that 
monopolistic competition was not so perfect either.  Prices were higher than marginal cost. 
Further, firms under monopolistic competition dedicated considerable resources toward product 
differentiation, leading to the view that product differentiation was “excessive.”  This led to 
discussions of such topics as whether annual style changes in the automobile industry should be 
regarded as an unfair method of competition.40 Relatedly, the intellectual property laws were 
thought to be harmful to the extent that they facilitated such differentiation.  The decades 
following the New Deal were characterized by a rapid expansion of antitrust policy accompanied 
by considerable hostility toward intellectual property rights, most notably patents and 
trademarks.41 
In any event, the ruinous competition problem itself became largely relegated to common 
carriers such as the railroads, public utilities, and other transport firms.  It has reappeared from 
time to time in antitrust price fixing case law, but only to be rejected.  The most recent is the 
Apple eBooks decision, which rejected the publishers’ argument that ruinous competition in 
electronic books justified their collective agreement to raise prices and impose these on 
Amazon.42 
One important but overhyped idea that originated in the 1960s and 1970s was that even 
natural monopoly franchises could operate competitively if competition were seen as being “for” 
rather than “in” the market.  Even if a market has room for only one seller at a time, competition 
to be that seller might keep prices at the competitive level without regulation.  The basic theory 
had already shown up in various “potential competition” antitrust cases.43  It was also implicit in 
the common law of requirements contracts.  For example, a store owner might prefer to have one 
person plow snow on an as needed basis over the course of a season, rather than taking bids for 
each snowstorm.  Courts had approved such contract since the Gilded Age.44  Even though there 
is only one snow plower over the year, the price is competitive because prospective sellers must 
bid and rebid for that contract, or franchise. 
Harold Demsetz famously queried, why could not the same principle apply to public 
utilities?45  Of course, the snow plower has assets such as a truck that can readily be moved from 
                                                          
40 E.g., FTC, Report on the Motor Vehicle Industry (1939).  The issues are summarized in Note, Annual 
Style Change in the Automobile Industry as an Unfair Method of Competition, 80 Yale L.J 567 (1971).  In 
its main brief to the Supreme Court in the Brown Shoe Merger Case, the government argued that rapid 
style changes in the shoe industry made it very difficult for smaller shoe manufacturers to compete.  Brief 
for the United States, Brown Shoe Co. v. United States (Nov. 15, 1961), 1961 WL 101890. 
41See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note __, at 198-200, 227-228, 288-289. 
42United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 333 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1376 (2016); see 
Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Design of Production, 103 CORNELL L. REV. ___ (2018) 
(forthcoming), available at file:///C:/Users/sherm/Downloads/SSRN-id3013122.  See also Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Information Technologies, 68 FLA. L. REV. 419, 438-40 (2016). 
43See, e.g., United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964) (two firms bidding to 
wholesale natural gas to Los Angeles should be regarded as competitors for merger purposes, even though 
only one of them had made any sales there). 
44See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note __ at 126-129. 
45See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J.L. & ECON. 55 (1968). 
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one site to another, permitting the market for plowing snow on a particular parking lot to be very 
competitive, provided that the prospective snow plowers behave competitively.  As soon as one 
begins to speak about utilities that have durable and nonmoveable installations, such as power, 
cable, or gas lines, the problem becomes much more complex.  The winner of the first round 
would have a significant bidding advantage over any prospective entrant who would have to 
install the system.  Alternatively, some mechanism might be established for transferring the 
system from the incumbent to the new winner, or perhaps a government such as a state or 
municipality could own the system, with successive firms simply agreeing to be its operators.46 
William Baumol, one of the most optimistic of contestable market proponents, proclaimed it 
to be “an uprising of in the Theory of Industry Structure.”47  To be sure, the theory of contestable 
markets was an important contribution to regulatory theory.  However, as a policy matter it never 
lived up to expectations.  Much of the technical theory turned into a discussion of cost 
classification – mainly, which costs were variable, which were fixed, and which were “sunk.”  
The later type was crucial.  Even a high fixed cost need not interfere with contestability if the 
asset in question, such as the snow plowing truck, is readily and costless transferrable from one 
market to another. For obvious reasons, much of the theory focused on the airline industry: 
although aircraft are costly and durable, if they can easily be transferred from one market to 
another in response to diverging prices the result should be competition.  But this theory of “hit 
and run” entry largely overlooked details such as the very substantial cost of airports, gate space 
leases, and other items that were not so readily transferable.48 Institutions, it seems, always get in 
the way.  The effect of deregulation of airlines has not been contestability, but rather imperfect 
competition or oligopoly among competitors, with frequent claims of price fixing.  The literature 
generally shows an inverse correlation between price and the number of carriers on a route – 
which is inconsistent with contestability but quite consistent with oligopoly or collusion.49  From 
a consumer welfare perspective, price competition among competing carriers is very likely much 
superior to the previous regime of price regulation by the now defunct Civil Aeronautics Board, 
but it is a far cry from contestability. 
                                                          
46Oliver E. Williamson, Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies—in general and with Respect to 
CATV, 7 BELL J. ECON. 73 (1976). 
47William J. Baumol, Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure, 72 AM. 
ECON. REV. 1 (1982).  The theory was expanded and later published in WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, JOHN C. 
PANZAR, & ROBERT D. WILLIG, CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 
(1988). 
48See General Accounting Office, Airline Competition: Effects of Airline Market Concentration and 
Barriers to Entry on Airfares (April 1991), available at https://www.gao.gov/assets/220/214117.pdf 
(under deregulation airline markets still exhibit higher prices as they become more concentrated, 
indicating lack of contestability). 
49See, e.g., Federico Ciliberto, Eddie Watkins, and Jonathan W. Williams, Two Screening Tests for Tacit 
Collusion: Evidence from the Airline Industry (July 29, 2017), available at 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/220/214117.pdf; 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3012580; Gaurab Aryal, Federico Ciliberto, & 
Benjamin T. Leyden, Public Communication in the Airline Industry (Feb. 2018, Center for Economic 
Policy Research, DP12730). 
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Cost Classification, Incentives, and Return-based Ratemaking. 
Under marginalism, the principal rationale for rate regulation moved from a focus on 
“public service” to one that focused on the nature of costs.  The historical rationale for rate 
regulation had been that certain firms were “affected with the publick interest,” in the words of 
Justice Matthew Hale, because of their strategic location.  He made that argument in reference to 
strategically located seaports which held effective monopolies in their service area.50  The United 
States Supreme Court adopted it to uphold state price regulation of grain elevators strategically 
located along railroad tracks.51  Blackstone’s justification for regulation used the term 
“prerogatives of the Crown” as opposed to “common callings.”52  Anyone could engage in a 
common calling, but only the Crown could authorize someone to exercise one of its prerogatives, 
which became the subject of exclusive grants.53 
  What distinguished these special firms was both that they were essential gateways to 
commerce and that competition was not believed to be possible because the market terrain, 
whether physical or economic, permitted only one firm.  Under marginalism, this rationale 
shifted to the one developed in the previous section – namely, that the firms were natural 
monopolies, typically with very high fixed costs.  As a result, the market itself would produce 
either ruinous competition or monopoly.  More technically, the long run average cost curved 
sloped downward continuously for such a distance that the optimal number of sustainable firms 
in a market was one.  That fact provided a rationale for price regulation, leaving the question of 
how to select the proper price. 
This neoclassical definition was significantly narrower than the common law 
classification scheme, which had historically recognized regulated monopoly status for things 
that were almost certainly not natural monopolies, but merely sellers that were regarded as 
deserving protection from “excessive” competition.  For example, according to Blackstone, at 
common law a retail market authorized by the local Lord was entitled to protection from 
                                                          
50Sir Matthew Hale, De Portibus Maris, in A TREATISE IN THREE PARTS (c. 1670), reprinted in 1 A 
COLLECTION OF TRACTS RELATIVE TO THE LAW OF ENGLAND 45 (F. Hargrave ed. 1787). 
51Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1876), quoting de Portibus Maris: 
A man, for his own private advantage, may, in a port or town, set up a wharf or crane, and may 
take what rates he and his customers can agree for cranage, wharfage, housellage, pesage; for he 
doth no more than is lawful for any man to do, viz., makes the most of his own. . . . If the king or 
subject have a public wharf, unto which all persons that come to that port must come and unlade 
or lade their goods as for the purpose, because they are the wharfs only licensed by the queen, . . . 
or because there is no other wharf in that port, as it may fall out where a port is newly erected; in 
that case there cannot be taken arbitrary and excessive duties for cranage, wharfage, pesage, &c., 
neither can they be enhanced to an immoderate rate; but the duties must be reasonable and 
moderate, though settled by the king's license or charter. For now the wharf and crane and other 
conveniences are affected with a public interest, and they cease to be juris privati only…. 
521 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 78 (London 1765-1769). 
53See William Letwin, The English Common Law Concerning Monopolies, 21 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 355 
(1954); Barry E Hawk, English Competition Law Before 1900, __ ANTITRUST BULL. __ (2018) 
(forthcoming), available at file:///C:/Users/hhovenka/Downloads/SSRN-id3116867.  
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competition for a seven-mile radius from its location, which was one third of a day’s journey.54  
As late as 1827 the Court of King’s Bench held it unlawful for the defendant to sell fish from his 
house within the specified distance from an authorized local market.55 New York Chancellor 
Kent opined in an 1812 decision involving a state issued steamboat patent that the government 
prerogative to grant exclusive charters for “beneficial public purposes” was clear and that “all 
our bank charters, turnpike, canal and bridge companies, ferries, markets, etc, are grants of 
exclusive privileges….”  He also acknowledged that the extent of these grants might be 
“inexpedient or unwise,” but that did not undermine the state’s power to grant them.56  His list 
included some things that could have been natural monopolies (canals and bridges) but others 
(banks and markets) that almost certainly were not. 
Exclusive grants to public service companies in the United States frequently came along 
with price regulation.  Prior to the Gilded Age, however, the prices were typically stipulated in 
the grantee’s charter rather than applied by legislation.57  In its 1837 Charles River Bridge 
decision the plaintiff argued that government-mandated spatial separation of toll bridges was 
necessary in order to prevent ruinous competition between them.58  The plaintiff’s charter also 
stipulated the tolls that it could charge to those crossing the bridge.59  These two elements of the 
modern public utility – a monopoly grant and regulated rates –were thus in place long prior to 
the marginalist revolution.60  The Supreme Court approved statutory price regulation in principle 
in Munn v. Illinois, although it did not consider whether the Constitution required any 
limitations.61  In Munn there was no charter in which rates could be specified, because Munn & 
                                                          
543 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note __ at 219. 
55Mosley v. Walker, 108 E.R. 640 (K.B. 640). 
56 Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns 507, 576 (Court for the Correction of Errors of New York, 1812). 
57HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE, supra note __ at 105-130. 
58Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of the Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 430, 442 
(1837). 
59STANLEY KUTLER, PRIVILEGE AND CREATIVE DESTRUCTION: THE CHARLES RIVER BRIDGE CASE 10, 
32-45 (1971).  The charter stipulated: 
Each foot passenger (or one person passing), two-thirds of a penny; one person and horse, two 
pence two-thirds of a penny; single horse cart or sled, or sley, four pence; wheelbarrows, hand-
carts, and other vehicles capable of carrying like weight, one penny, one-third of a penny; single 
horse and chaise, or sulkey, eight pence; coaches, chariots, phaetons and curricles, one shilling 
each; all other wheel carriages or sleds drawn by more than one beast, six pence; meat cattle and 
horses passing the said bridge, exclusive of those rode or in carriages or teams, one penny, one-
third of a penny; swine and sheep, four pence for each dozen, and at the same rate for a greater or 
less number; and in all cases the same toll shall be paid for all carriages and vehicles passing the 
said bridge, whether the same be loaded or not loaded; and to each team one man and no more 
shall be allowed as a driver to pass free from payment of toll, and in all cases double toll shall be 
paid on the Lord's day; and at all times when the toll gatherer shall not attend his duty the gate or 
gates shall be left open. 
60On the legal evolution see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE, supra note __ at 125-130. 
61Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877). 
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Scott was a common law partnership.62 In the Spring Valley Water case in 1884 the Supreme 
Court again approved statutory rate regulation, in this case of water rates by a privately operated 
water works.63  The statute required that water rates be “reasonable,” and created a commission 
to determine reasonableness.64 In approving this procedure, however, the court stated that it was 
reserving judgment on the possibility that such a commission might set a ‘manifestly 
unreasonable” rate.65  Finally, in 1898 the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment 
prohibited a state from imposing a railroad rate that generated less than “fair value” on the 
railroad’s property.66 
While the Interstate Commerce Commission had been created in 1887, it did not have full 
authority to set rates, preempting state law, until 1920.67  Pending that, most rate regulation 
befell the states.  The statutory or administrative setting of rates in price regulated industries had 
always involved some kind of notion that rates must be “above cost,” sufficient to give the 
regulated firm a reasonable rate of return. 
What marginalist price theory provided was a cost classification system for establishing 
the Constitution’s minimum standard of reasonableness.  Aside from sporadic attempts to 
regulate commodity prices, price regulation prior to the Civil War was largely ad hoc, negotiated 
on an individual firm basis.  By contrast, neoclassical price theory sorted industries by cost 
structure.  In 1887, the same year that the Interstate Commerce Act was passed, Henry Carter 
Adams wrote an important article classifying industries into three groups: those with decreasing 
returns to scale, those with constant returns to scale, and those with increasing returns to scale.  
For industries in the third classification, he argued, competition could not be relied on to make 
firms perform well.  Firms with higher output would have lower costs than smaller ones, leading 
to a monopoly unless they were constrained.  Adams’ principal example was the railroads.68 
Much of the early neoclassical theory of cost-based price regulation developed in debates 
over the proper treatment of railroads, an industry that was tailor-made for study of the 
marginalist economics of costs.  The railroads had very high fixed costs for land, track networks, 
and equipment, but also significant variable, or operating costs, including fuel and labor.  The 
market appeared not to do a very good job of providing the conditions for competitive 
equilibrium.  If a line was too isolated its owners would earn monopoly returns.  State officials 
often responded by chartering additional railroads, resulting in significant overbuilding and 
                                                          
62See Wabash, St. L. & Pac. Ry. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 569 (1886) (“the case of Munn v. Illinois was 
selected by the court as the most appropriate one in which to give its opinions on that subject; because 
that case presented the question of a private citizen, or unincorporated partnership”). 
63Spring Valley Water-Works v. Schottler, 110 U.S. 347 (1884). 
64Id. at 353. 
65Id.at 354. 
66Smyth v. Ames, 171 U.S. 361 (1898).  See Robert L. Hale, Does the Ghost of Smyth v. Ames Still 
Walk?, 55 HARV. L. REV. 1116 (1942).  For a contemporary defense of agency rate regulation, see 
Adelbert Moot, Railway Rate Regulation, 19 Harv. L. Rev. 487 (1906). 
67Pub. L. No. 66-152, 41 Stat. 456 (1920), codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C. (Transportation Act 
of 1920). 
68Henry C. Adams, Relation of the State to Industrial Action, 1 PUB. AM. ECON. ASSN. 7 (1887). 
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complaints about “ruinous competition” already in the 1890s.69  Because most shipping services 
were fungible, excess capacity tended to drive rates to marginal cost, without enough remaining 
to amortize fixed costs.  In this atmosphere it is no wonder that several economists and legal 
writers advocated “pooling,” which was essentially cartelization, of competing railroads.70  
Indeed, the Interstate Commerce Commission had approved the very rate setting pool that the 
Supreme Court condemned in its first antitrust decision on the merits, the Trans-Missouri case in 
1897.71 
While collusion would protect the railroads from ruinous competition, it would not 
protect customers, however.  A railroad cartel would charge its profit-mazimizing price just as a 
single firm monopolist would, not the minimum price needed to sustain investment in the 
industry.  In the 1880s Gilded Age scholars of railway regulation such as eventual Yale president 
Arthur Twining Hadley embarked on a serious economic analysis of railroad costs and pricing.72  
Already by this time, railroad operators and economists understood that paying off fixed cost 
debt required keeping output high, and that this would be facilitated by permitting price 
discrimination.  Hadley showed how bringing in incremental freight at a lower rate served to 
reduce overall costs, provided that the rate was greater than incremental operating costs.73  
Hadley was already closing in on a fundamental conception of mid-twentieth century rate 
regulation:74 absent capacity constraints the optimal rate brings in every set of customers at the 
highest rate that class is willing to pay, thus maximizing output.  But of course, that was price 
discrimination which could be trusted to produce loud complaints from those required to pay the 
higher prices. 
The need to price discriminate in order to keep output up led to rate classification rules 
that seem hysterically complicated and fundamentally unfair to outside observers, although their 
purpose was clear: any freight rate sufficient to cover the variable costs of shipment would make 
a positive contribution to net revenue.  By bringing in every such customer at the highest price 
they were willing to pay, the railroad maximized its net revenue and could divide its fixed costs 
over a larger number of sales.  Offsetting this, of course, would be the administrative cost of  
                                                          
69See discussion supra, text at notes __. 
70E.g., Edwin R.A. Seligman, Railway Tariffs and the Interstate Commerce Law II, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 369 
(1887); Arthur T. Hadley, The Prohibition of Railway Pools, 4 Q. ECON. 158 (1890).  For further 
discussion see Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age: Federalism and the Railroad 
Problem, 97 YALE L.J 1017 (1988). 
71United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 58 F. 58, 76-77 (8th Cir. 1893), quoting the fourth annual 
report of the Interstate Commerce Commission, which had approved the arrangement (“‘To make 
railroads of the greatest possible service to the country, contract relations would be essential, because 
there would need to be joint tariffs, joint running arrangements and interchange of cars, and a giving of 
credit to a large extent, some of which were obviously beyond the reach of compulsory legislation, and, 
even if they were not, could be best settled, and all the incidents and qualifications fixed, by the voluntary 
action of the parties in control of the roads respectively.”). 
72ARTHUR TWINING HADLEY, RAILROAD TRANSPORTATION: ITS HISTORY AND ITS LAW (1885). 
73Id. at 117.  See also Frank W. Taussig, A Contribution to the Theory of Railway Rates, 5 Q. J. ECON. 
438 (1891) (showing more technically the efficiency of price discrimination). 
74See the discussion of Ramsey pricing, infra, text at notes __. 
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developing so many classifications, including disputing classification costs with unhappy 
customers or their rivals.75  These solutions, extended to other public utilities, produced much of 
the modern neoclassical economics of industrial organization and price theory, including third-
degree price discrimination.  For example, the Ramsey pricing solution discussed below 
contemplated very elaborate rate classifications, literally assessing a rate equal to each individual 
customer’s willingness to pay.76 
Once marginalism led to classification of costs as fixed, variable, and marginal, the basic 
theory of rate regulation became simple enough.  The devil was in the details.  The regulated 
utility, transportation, or other firm is entitled to a fair rate of return on its fixed cost investment, 
plus “pass through” of its variable costs.  This has come to be called “rate of return” regulation 
or “cost of service” ratemaking.77 It has been widely used for a century, but also widely 
criticized, mainly for providing insufficient incentives for firms to innovate or reduce costs.78  It 
also produced a lengthy Constitutional debate about the rate base – namely, whether the firm’s 
return should be based on replacement cost of worn out plant and equipment, or whether it was 
enough that the firm receive a positive return on its actual historical investment, which was 
typically much lower.79  During the Substantive Due Process Era the Supreme Court had insisted 
on “fair value” and this was generally interpreted by contemporaries as replacement cost.80  The 
Court’s formulation of the requirements in Smyth v. Ames was: 
in order to ascertain that [fair] value, the original cost of construction, the amount 
expended in permanent improvements, the amount and market value of its bonds and 
stock, the present as compared with the original cost of construction, the probable earning 
                                                          
75 See, e.g., United States v. Western Pac. R. Co, 352 U.S. 59 (1956) (dispute involving higher tariffs for 
napalm-containing bombs); Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Merchants’ Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285 (1922) 
(grain). 
76 See discussion infra, text at notes __. 
77The standard treatment is ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND 
INSTITUTIONS (2d ed. 1988). See also JAMES C. BONBRIGHT, ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY 
RATES (1988); CHARLES F. PHILLIPS, JR., THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE (1993). 
78E.g., Harvey Averch & Leland Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint, 52 AM. 
ECON. REV. 1052 (1962). 
79The debate became contributed to the early law and economics movement.  E.g., Robert L. Hale, Rate 
Making and the Revision of the Property Concept, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 209 (1922) (arguing for historical 
cost) 
80E.g., Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 541 (1898).  The Court indicated that even a rate that provided for 
full recovery of all costs, including interest and a dividend to shareholders, would be insufficient if less 
than fair market value: 
 It cannot, therefore, be admitted that a railroad corporation maintaining a highway under the 
authority of the state may fix its rates with a view solely to its own interests, and ignore the rights 
of the public. But the rights of the public would be ignored if rates for the transportation of 
persons or property on a railroad are exacted without reference to the fair value of the property 
used for the public, or the fair value of the services rendered, but, in order simply that the 
corporation may meet operating expenses, pay the interest on its obligations, and declare a 
dividend to stockholders. 
Id. at 544. 
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capacity of the property under particular rates prescribed by statute, and the sum required 
to meet operating expenses, are all matters for consideration, and are to be given such 
weight as may be just and right in each case. We do not say that there may not be other 
matters to be regarded in estimating the value of the property.81 
Finally in its Hope Natural Gas decision (1944), the Supreme Court upheld a rate based on 
historical cost as the Constitutional minimum.82 
Two of the most serious criticisms of rate of return regulation are, first, that the basic 
formulation leads to inefficient pricing to the extent that pass through of variable costs is not a 
sufficiently close approximation of marginal cost.  Second, the administration of cost-of-service 
ratemaking takes away firms’ incentives to innovate and reduce costs. 
On the first.  Cost of service rate making is not a close approximation to marginal cost 
pricing.  A single price equal to marginal cost would be far too low for most public utilities 
because it would not compensate the utility for its fixed costs.  But how should fixed costs be 
allocated?  The Ramsey solution, which was intended to maximize output and thus reduce the 
impact of fixed costs, was to price to each customer at the inverse of that customer’s elasticity of 
demand.83  While Ramsey formalized this solution in the 1920s and it bears his name, railroads 
had already been doing a rather nontechnical version of this for decades, as Arthur Twining 
Hadley’s 1885 book on railroad rates had elaborated.  Regulators understood that the key to 
profitability was to maximize output on the existing fixed cost network.  Any shipper willing to 
pay more than running expenses was profitable in the short run.  At the same time, however, 
someone had to amortize fixed costs.  As a result, the elaborate railroad rate classification 
schemes made rates for lower value goods such as coal or cement that were far below the rates 
charged for higher value finished goods.  They also charged significantly higher prices per mile 
for short hauls than for long hauls.84  The rationale for that phenomenon is readily apparent to 
anyone who looks at a map of the American railroad network.  Often there was only one railroad 
between two fairly nearby towns.  However, as the dropping and pickup points became further 
apart the network provided more alternatives, making it possible for more railroads to compete 
for the same shipment.  That is, the amount of competition in the market increased as the 
distance between the two shipping points increased.85 
                                                          
81Id. at 546-547. 
82 FPC v. Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. 591 (1944). 
83Frank P. Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of taxation, 37 ECON. J. 47 (1927).   See, e.g., 
Burlington Northern R. co. v. ICC, 985 F.2d 589, 596 (D.C.Cir. 1993): 
Under Ramsey pricing, the regulator allows firms to charge each user a premium over marginal 
cost in inverse proportion to the elasticity of the user's demand. Because the highest charges fall 
on the most inelastic demanders, the impact on total usage is minimized. Thus, the Commission 
believed, it would reconcile the railroad's need for revenue to cover total costs with the least 
possible distortion of demand (i.e., railroad usage would approximate as nearly as possible the 
level that would prevail under perfect competition). 
84See, e.g., ARTHUR T. HADLEY, RAILROAD TRANSPORTATION: ITS HISTORY AND ITS LAWS 117 (1885) 
85See Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age: Federalism and the Railroad Problem, 
97 YALE L.J. 1017, 1056 (2017). 
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One idea intended to make regulated pricing resemble market pricing more closely was 
Ronald Coase’s suggestion of two part pricing, which roughly segregated the fixed and variable 
cost components, permitting marginal cost pricing of the latter.86  Coase argued that every 
customer could be required to pay an access fee which was fixed, in the sense that it did not vary 
with the number of units that the customer used.  This fee would be calculated so as to cover the 
fixed cost components of public utility costs.  Then each customer’s actual use would be priced 
out at marginal cost. 
Coase’s article had actually been written as a response to Harold Hotelling’s far more 
interventionist approach, which was to require the government to pay the fixed cost proportion of 
transportations and utilities by providing the infrastructure, and then charging customers the 
marginal cost of operation.87  Hotelling’s argument was highly praised by prominent public 
utility scholars such as James Bonbright.88  Coase, who was always fierce in searching out 
private alternatives, sought one that would minimize government control.  Without getting too 
deeply into the weeds, it is worth noting that this debate, which occurred in the 1930s and 1940s, 
reveals how central marginalist conceptions had become in economic thinking about regulated 
pricing, even among those who advocated for a high degree of public ownership. 
The second development, which was to have a major impact on the deregulation 
movement, was Averch’s and Johnson’s theory of gold-plating.89  Economically, the “Averch-
Johnson effect” operates as a severe qualification on Coase’s “The Nature of the Firm” when the 
firm is in a price-regulated environment.90  Coase actually conceived of his own article as a first 
attempt to apply marginalist economics to questions about the optimal size and shape of a 
business firm.  He opened his paper with praise for Marshall: 
It is hoped to show … that a definition of a firm may be obtained which is not only 
realistic … but tractable by two of the most powerful instruments of economic analysis 
developed by Marshall, the idea of the margin and that of substitution, together giving the 
idea of substitution at the margin.91 
 
Coase argued that the firm, driven entirely by the need to maximize its profits, 
relentlessly compares the marginal cost of doing something internally against the marginal cost 
                                                          
86Ronald H. Coase, The Marginal Cost Controversy, 13 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 169 (1946).  For elaboration, 
see 1 KAHN, ECONOMICS OF REGULATION, supra note __ at 95-100. 
87Harold Hotelling, The General Welfare in Relation to Problems of Taxation of Railway and Utility 
Rates, 6 ECONOMETRICA 242 (1938). 
88James C. Bonbright, Major Controversies as the Criteria of Reasonable Public Utility Rates, 30 AM. 
ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 379 (1941) (following Hotelling).  See also Nanch Ruggles, Recent 
Developments in the Theory of Marginal Cost Pricing, 17 REV. ECON. STUD. 107 (1949). 
89Harvey Averch & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint, 52 AM. 
ECON. REV. 1052 (1962). 
90Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 386 (1937). 
91Id. at 386. 
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of procurement from outside, choosing whichever produces the largest payoff.  As a result, the 
firm’s structure is “efficient” to the extent that the markets in which it purchases are efficient.92 
 
But suppose the firm is guaranteed a profitable price, equal to or slightly above marginal 
cost, on all of its durable procurements.  The firm will have an incentive to perform activities 
internally rather than through purchase on the market, even though the latter is the better choice 
in a competitive market.  The firm would have an incentive to integrate vertically or to expand 
into other markets that would not exist absent regulation. To the extent that it gets its rate of 
return on its capital investment and is limited to pass through of costs for variable cost items 
such as labor, it has an incentive to invest relatively more in capital assets.  As a result, regulated 
firms tend to be excessively capital intensive when compared with the unregulated market.93  
Perhaps more ominously, the regulated firm would have an incentive to build unneeded 
infrastructure, knowing that it would be guaranteed a profitable rate of return.94  By contrast, a 
competitive firm would enlarge its plant only if anticipated receipts, determined entirely by the 
market, exceeded anticipated costs. 
The Averch-Johnson literature produced interesting collateral issues, such as the 
regulated utility’s right to recover for its “stranded” costs, which are costs incurred in 
enlargement of infrastructure that later turned out to be unnecessary or unwise. 95  In some cases 
this happened because of policy changes that made a previous investment, such as a coal-fired 
plant or hospital’s certificate of need,96 improvident. Importantly, however, firms acting under 
regulation often propose capital investments to a regulator, and Averch-Johnson suggests this 
can happen even if those investments would have been inefficient in a competitive market.  Then 
later, when the regulator comes to its senses or the increased demand that the regulated utility 
promised do not materialize, the regulator withdraws its authorization.  This might leave a 
partially built or recently on line plant “stranded,” in the sense that it is no longer needed.  The 
firm may then claim that the regulatory approval and its subsequent retraction is an improper 
taking of its property without compensation.97 
                                                          
92 Note that monopoly in a supply market might induce a firm to do something internally even though 
external procurement might be cheaper if that market were competitive. 
93For a simple economic analysis, together with a summary of the most important critiques, see W. KIP 
VISCUSI, JOHN M. VERNON, & JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON, JR., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND 
ANTITRUST 433-436 (4th ed. 2005); JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, A THEORY OF INCENTIVES 
IN PROCUREMENT AND REGULATION 91-93 (1993).  For more technical treatment see Paul L. Joskow, 
Regulation of Natural Monopolies 1229, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (A. Mitchell 
Polinsky & Steven Shavell, eds., 2007). For deep skepticism, see Stephen M. Law, Assessing the Averch-
Johnson-Wellisz Effect for Regulated Utilities, 6 INT’L J. ECON. & FIN. 41 (2014). 
94See 1 ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 35-36 
(1970). 
95See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Takings Clause and Improvident Regulatory Bargains, 108 YALE L.J. 801 
(1999). 
96 On the latter, see Michael E. Granfield, Resource Allocation Within Hospitals: an Unambiguous 
Analytical Test of the A-J Hypothesis, 7 J. APPLIED ECON. 241 (1975) 
97See GREGORY SIDAK AND DANIEL F. SPULBUR, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE REGULATORY 
CONTRACT: THE COMPETITIVE TRANSFORMATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES IN THE UNITED STATES 
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No matter how one feels about Averch-Johnson, one thing that emerges clearly is that 
cost-of-service rate making is not the best way to determine price and output in any market 
where competition is viable.  As a result, price regulated markets must be pared down so that 
price and output actually be regulated only in those portions of the market where competition 
seems not to work. This has been one of the principal consequences of the deregulation 
movement discussed below.98 
The Changing Domain of Market Failure: Regulation and Public Choice 
 The marginalist revolution gave the United States the “mixed” economy that it has 
today.99  Under marginalism, markets are not as robust as pre-marginalists believed, but they 
remain the dominant means by which resources move around.  The most important economic 
policy function of government today is identification of markets that work well when left 
relatively untended and those that do not, and then coming up with the correct prescription for 
those in the latter group. 
This makes the concept of “market failure” central to modern public decision making.  In 
the political economy of regulation, the term has more than a single meaning.  The dominant 
definition within neoclassical economics relates to the inability of a market to reach an 
equilibrium on its own, or otherwise to reach only equilibria that exhibit unsatisfactory output 
and prices.100  As an example of the latter, when entry is impossible monopoly may be a stable 
equilibrium, but one in which price and output are suboptimal. 
Under the strictest definition, static market failure is any durable deviation from marginal 
cost pricing.  Of course, dynamic factors such as innovation may simultaneously increase the 
innovator’s price-cost margins while also increasing output or welfare, at least in the long run.101  
For example, one of the longest-standing responses to market failure is the intellectual property 
system, which involves government creation of exclusive rights to facilitate limited periods of 
high price-cost margins as an inducement to innovation.  In any event, market failure is often 
defined in ways that do not use Pareto efficiency or perfect competition as a baseline – for 
                                                          
(1997).  See also Emily Hammond & Jim Rossi, Stranded Costs and Grid Decarbonization, 82 BROOK. 
L. REV. 645 (2017). 
98See discussion infra, text at notes __. 
99 For a robust defense, see JACOB S. HACKER AND PAUL PIERSON, AMERICAN AMNESIA: HOW THE WAR 
ON GOVERNMENT LED US TO FORGET WHAT MADE AMERICA PROSPER (2017). 
100The standard discussion is Francis M. Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure, 72 Q. J. ECON. 351 
(1958).  An effort at a strict definition is Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 
REV. ECON. & STAT. 387 (1954).  For good commentary, see PUBLIC GOODS AND MARKET FAILURES: A 
CRITICAL EXAMINATION (Tyler Cowen, ed. 2017). 
101See, e.g., Richard R. Nelson, Thinking About Technology Policy: “Market Failures” versus 
“Innovation Systems” (working paper, UCL Inst. For Innovation and Public Purpose (Oct. 2017), 
available at https://www.ucl.ac.uk/bartlett/public-purpose/publications/2018/jan/thinking-about-
technology-policy-market-failures-versus-innovation-systems  
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example, one can speak of it as “the failure of the market to bring about results that are in the 
best interests of society as a whole.”102 
The technical neoclassical definition of market failure generally excludes purely 
distributive factors. Of course, sometimes income inequality can lead to market failure, 
particularly when inequality makes it more costly for poorer people to move into more 
productive occupations,103 or when lack of competitive pressure on certain groups induces them 
to be less productive.104  To the extent maldistribution of wealth impairs productivity, and thus 
output, it can be a market failure even under a strictly neoclassical definition. 
 The classical political economists had strong faith in markets.  To be sure, there were 
some qualifications, such as Thomas Malthus population argument that the market would 
invariably force the population to subsistence levels,105 Ricardo’s concerns with monopoly in 
land rents,106 or perhaps most famously John Stuart Mill’s discussion of natural monopoly and 
the British postal system or lines for gas lighting.107  But for the most part the classical political 
economists regarded these as rare exceptions to the general theory of markets.  That was even 
truer of classical political economy in the United States, where an abundance of undeveloped 
land was widely seen as making the concerns expressed by Ricardo and Malthus relatively 
unimportant.108  Increasingly after the Jackson era, American legislatures and courts trusted 
markets to allocate resources properly.  Some states even invalidated monopoly rights for rather 
clear natural monopoly industries, such as gas lighting.109 
A common characteristic of the bridges, toll roads, canals, and railroads that received 
monopoly charters is that they required a significant fixed cost investment and in most cases one 
installation would be adequate to handle all of the traffic.110 As a result, they were true natural 
monopolies. Competition would drive prices to marginal cost without enough remaining to cover 
fixed costs.   Indeed, in the Charles River Bridge case the plaintiffs raised the “ruinous 
                                                          
102Alain Marciano and Steven G. Medema, Introduction: Market Failure in Context, 47 HIST. POL. ECON, 
1 (2015). 
103See, e.g., Kim A. Weeden and David B. Grusky, Inequality and Market Failure, 38 AMERICAN 
BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 473 (2013). 
104 For example, if it could be shown that a tax and transfer system that levelled income also increased 
productivity, then this would be a correction of a market failure in the neoclassical sense. 
105THOMAS ROBERT MALTHUS, ESSAY ON THE PRINCIPLE OF POPULATION (1798). 
106DAVID RICARDO, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION (1817). 
107JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 143 (1848).  
108Herbert Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substantive Due Process, 40 STAN. L. REV. 379, 421-
431 (1988), summarizing how nineteenth century American political economists believed that the vast 
amounts of undeveloped land in the United States established that the threats offered by Malthus and 
Ricardo would occur in the distant future, if at all. 
109 E.g., Norwich Gas Light Co. v. Norwich City Gas Co., 25 Conn. 19 (1856) (invalidating monopoly 
grants for a gas light utility granted by both the state and the local government, and permitting second 
firm to install competing lines). 
110See HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE, 105-169, 199-206. 
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competition” defense sixty years before it came into use in railroad cases.111 Tolls decreased by 
half to two-thirds upon the opening of the competing Warren Bridge.112  By the time the case 
reached the Supreme Court the Charles River Bridge had already closed.  It would reopen in 
1841 when the Commonwealth turned it into a free bridge.113 
 At least for a time, the marginalist revolution very largely brought the classicists’ robust 
faith in markets to an end – a view undoubtedly aided by World War I and the Depression.  The 
concerns about fixed costs and failure of equilibrium discussed previously114 were one 
significant manifestation, but there were others.  The dramatic rise of antitrust was driven by the 
belief that even markets that are not natural monopolies can fail.  Indeed, the extent to which 
antitrust was brought to bear in nonmonopolized markets is striking.  After the New Deal 
Antitrust became a vehicle for controlling manufacturer-created distribution systems in 
competitively structured markets,115 as well as controlling price differences between competing 
dealers,116 and for limiting the effects of product differentiation.  Underlying this was a fear of 
vertical integration that, at least as a matter of economics, can only be described as hysterical.117 
Increasingly after the mid-twentieth century, regulatory theory embraced a renewed 
neoclassicism that once again saw markets as robust, although not as robust as they were 
perceived by the classicists.  Coasean thinking strongly emphasized market solutions, even in 
markets that did not meet the requirements for perfect competition.  Indeed, the Coase Theorem 
itself focused on bargaining in bilateral monopolies.118  Entitlements such as communications 
spectrum119 or the right to pollute became tradeable and the scope of market failure declined to 
near non-existence.  In the Coasean vision even the lighthouse, frequently given as an example 
of resistance to free market supply, became freed from government control.120 
Worse yet, the rise of modern public choice theory in the 1960s turned interest group 
capture rather than market failure into the positive rationale for regulation.  Writers like 
Buchanan and Tullock began with perfect competition as the baseline, and then sought to explain 
how democratic political voting produced harmful deviations.121  Mancur Olson’s much more 
popular but equally devastating Logic of Collective Action also began with competitive markets 
                                                          
111Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of the Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 430, 448, 
461 (1837).  On the railroads and ruinous competition, see discussion supra, text at notes __. 
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114See discussion supra, text at notes __. 
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as a baseline and then tried to explain regulatory deviations as political oligopolies or cartels that 
enriched their organizers at the expense of society.122  Ironically, Olson borrowed his regulatory 
oligopoly theory straight from Edward Chamberlin, who had been his dissertation director.123  
Under the Stigler-Posner-Pelzman model of regulation, its roots lay in political bargaining 
among special interests rather than in anything having much to do with neoclassical price theory 
or industrial organization theory.124  Interest group capture became the dominant explanation 
device for regulation.125 
Ironically, theories of interest group capture actually entered American politico-economic 
discourse from the left, through writers such as Charles Beard and Gabriel Kolko.  Beard argued 
during the Progressive Era that the Constitution was largely a product of capture by urban 
owners of personal property over much more populous but widely dispersed agrarian interests.126  
Kolko, a Marxist, argued in the 1960s that Gilded Age railroad regulation really occurred at the 
behest of the railroads themselves, who wanted regulation in order to shelter themselves from 
competition.127  After that, regulatory capture theory moved rightward.128 
 Today we seem to have reached a balance in regulatory theory in which a combination of 
traditional price and organization economics and public choice theory are called upon as the best 
positive explainers of regulatory policy.  In a democratic society, to see regulation as nothing 
more than the consequence of market structure or cost characteristics is naïve, but so is seeing it 
as nothing more than the outcome of fights among competing interest groups.  For example, 
today in the great majority of states groceries, clothing, and automobiles are sold in markets that 
are more or less competitive, with price set predominantly through voluntary transactions.  By 
contrast, retail electricity and natural gas are sold through regulated monopolies.  Few would 
seriously argue that this is because electric power lobbyists have more clout than those who work 
in the food and agricultural markets. 
To be sure, interest group theory may explain much of the details of regulatory policy.  
As noted below, the deregulation movement has done a great service by distinguishing those 
attributes of the economy that are best left to the market from those that require more 
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governmental decision making.129  In the process, however, the deregulation movement faces 
abundant criticism from those who think it has gone too far on the one side, and those who think 
that it has not gone far enough on the other. 
Market Diversity and Agency Sector regulation 
 Market diversity and market failure go hand in hand.  Markets are like Tolstoy’s families.  
Happy families are all pretty much alike, but each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.130 
When markets work well they require relatively little government attention other than the rules 
of property and contract, which are very largely common to all.  But they fail for reasons that are 
typically quite specific.  Even natural monopolies, while exhibiting a common set of 
characteristics, have unique features and information requirements that operate on the regulator. 
An important consequence of the marginalist revolution was the idea that markets differ 
from one another, particularly when they fail.  As a result, they were thought to require different 
regulatory fixes.  This thesis flowed from two things.  First the cost classifications that occupied 
marginalists, including the emergent theory of regulated monopoly, not only made price and 
output analysis more complex, it also revealed that while firms within the same market and using 
the same technology often were more-or-less the same, the firms in one market could have cost 
structures that were quite different from those in another market.  Further, the relationship 
between fixed costs and market size varied enormously.  A relatively small railroad operating 
within a single state might require price regulation, while giant petroleum or steel refiners might 
be made to operate differently.  Large markets tended to require larger regulators – most notably 
the federal government if they spilled over more than a single state.  Small markets were best 
controlled by smaller regulators – namely, the states and governmental subdivisions.  The 
diversity was not merely geographic, however.  It was also production or technology specific.  
For example, the cost classification problems that might show up in electric power generation 
differed from those for natural gas production or telecommunications. Agencies with unique and 
exclusive jurisdictions were in large part a response to this perception of market diversity, 
replacing a nineteenth century conception in which most “regulating” was carried on by courts of 
general jurisdiction. 
 The other problem leading to agency regulation was risk management.131 Once again, 
however, the nature and technical features of the relevant risks could vary widely from one 
technology or product to another.  Classical valuations that depended on the past did not take risk 
into account because relevant risks were already encountered and included in the calculus.  But 
risk became a significant – indeed, in some cases overwhelming – part of valuation and 
optimization within the marginalist framework.  This is particularly true of activities that produce 
numerous spillovers or other situations where the market itself or the common law cannot force 
people to internalize the social harm their activities cause. 
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Hovenkamp Marginalism and Regulation  June 2018, Page 24 
 
Deregulation 
 The deregulation movement forced reexamination of many issues in the debate over 
neoclassical market theory and the rationales for government intervention.  The movement began 
in government policy during the waning years of the Carter administration and accelerated 
during the 1980s.132 The initial impact of deregulation has been substantial. By one measure, 
industries characterized by “full” regulation of price and entry produced about 17 percent of the 
GNP in 1977, but about 6.6 percent in 1988.133  The deregulation movement was significantly a 
reaction to excesses in the granting of monopoly status and needless rate-of-return price 
regulation.  Then Professor Stephen Breyer’s 1984 book, Regulation and its Reform, pointed out 
how legal entry restrictions and price regulation were imposed in industries such as trucking that 
were competitively structured or at least capable of being so.134 
At the theoretical level the deregulation movement was a response to several 
developments.  An important one was changes in technology.135  For example, thanks to the 
development of wireless and advanced switching capabilities, the justifications for a single 
natural monopoly telephone system disappeared.  The real instigators were wireless firms such as 
MCI and Sprint who convinced courts and the FCC to upset AT&T strenuously defended 
dominance.136  More theoretically, it became clear that regulation could be a very costly 
enterprise in relation to any benefits that it produced.  One well known early example of this 
critique is the evolution of James Landis, Chairman of the SEC during the New Deal.  In 
writings a generation apart Landis initially lauded regulation as the savior of the economy,137 but 
later lamented that it had not come close to satisfying expectations.138 
However, most of the low hanging fruit has already been picked. Further deregulation 
may threaten the environmental, health, or safety by amounts considerably greater than the cost 
savings themselves, depending on the industry.139  That is more likely to be the case as a greater 
amount of regulation is made subject to mandatory cost-benefit analysis, and as the 
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methodologies of CBA have improved.  If a regulation was fully and accurately evaluated under 
CBA, then removing it by implication will cause more harm than good. 
 Contestability theory, which was widely touted as opening the path toward broad 
deregulation,140 has actually had much less to do with implementing deregulation than have more 
fundamental concerns about the values of incumbent competition and the economic inefficiency 
of regulation, particularly those expressed in the Averch-Johnson literature.141  For the most part, 
when deregulation has moved markets from regulated monopoly to some sort of competition the 
competition that emerged has been among incumbent firms, not monopoly incumbents who vied 
with one another for the right to occupy that position.  In other words, the Williamson analysis of 
contestability, emphasizing the difficulties in the presence of costly and durable infrastructure, 
has been much more influential on actual policy than the Demsetz analysis.142  The exceptions 
have tended to occur in situations where the production facility, network or grid is already in 
place and the market proceeds by competitive bids for single suppliers during a defined time 
period. 
 The greatest focus of deregulation has been on situations where competition among 
actual incumbents is possible and markets or political institutions can be designed in a way that 
will accommodate them.  The earliest targets for deregulation, which included trucking and 
passenger airlines, certainly fell into that category.  More networked industries eventually 
followed.  For example, the dramatic increases in the amount of competition that have occurred 
in telecommunications since the 1982 antitrust consent decree143 and the 1996 
Telecommunications Act144 have largely been increases in competition among multiple 
incumbent firms.  Contestability theory has not had a significant role.  AT&T’s divestiture of 
Western Electric led to a fiercely competitive market for devices.145  For a lengthy period local 
telephony operated as a price-regulated monopoly, while long distance provision was 
competitively structured.146  Today even local service is competitive, although the competition is 
typically between the resident ILEC147 and one or more cable or other internet service providers 
that sell VOIP148 or perhaps a different technology.  Looking at the economy as a whole, true 
contestability, where a single firm is the current seller in a market with significant infrastructure 
but must re-bid for that right, is a relative rarity. 
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 The other thing that has accompanied deregulation is a counterbalancing increase in the 
use of antitrust law.149  For example, under comprehensive regulation industries such as the 
airlines were once regarded as virtually immune from antitrust scrutiny,150 but hardly today.  
Substantially, this is the result of a paradigm shift in the theory of regulation, away from the 
control of markets and toward the control of practices.  In most cases of deregulation, regulators 
do not simply exit from a market.  Rather, they apply regulatory tools more selectively.  During 
the 1960s we tended to think of federal agency regulation as “pervasive,” in the sense that it left 
little discretion over pricing and exclusionary practices to the individual firm, and when these 
occurred they were usually placed within the jurisdiction of the regulatory agency.151  Today, 
however, we view regulation as more “transactional,” in that it applies to a particular practice 
rather than an entire industry.  When a specific transaction is within the jurisdiction of the 
agency and the agency is actually overseeing it, then antitrust has no role to play.  But antitrust 
can be brought to bear in those areas that the regulators do not tend.152  This hybrid approach is 
particularly descriptive of telecommunications, the airlines, healthcare, and to a lesser extent 
energy. 
Wealth Distribution 
 The issues swirling around regulation and wealth distribution tend to focus on two 
concerns.  The first is whether government control should be used to redistribute wealth for its 
own sake, simply because we regard certain distributions as unfair or we think social welfare is 
greater by some measure as wealth is more evenly distributed.  The other is whether 
maldistribution of wealth affects productivity, and thus redistribution may spur economic 
growth.  The latter one falls within modern neoclassical concerns about regulation. Under most 
conceptions of economic welfare, the former one does not. 
For the first two generations of marginalists, concerns about the distribution of wealth in 
the economy were paramount.  Further, since most did not expect that maldistribution of wealth 
would right itself through ordinary market forces, some kind of government intervention was 
thought necessary. 
 The early marginalists believed in declining marginal utility, but also in the policy value 
of interpersonal utility comparisons.  All things equal, a more even distribution of wealth 
produced greater welfare.  Individuals were thought to experience declining marginal utility for 
any good, including wealth, as they have more.  The leap the early marginalists were willing to 
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make was that this attribute applied across persons as well as to a single individual.  For 
example, Marshall wrote in the third edition of Principles that “[A] pound's worth of satisfaction 
to an ordinary poor man is a much greater thing than a pound's worth of satisfaction to an 
ordinary rich man.”153  Marshall’s successor at Cambridge, Arthur C. Pigou, followed: a 
“transference of income from a relatively rich man to a relatively poor man of similar 
temperament, since it enables more intense wants to be satisfied at the expense of less intense 
wants, must increase the aggregate sum of satisfaction.”154  Many early American marginalists 
agreed.  For example, Chicago economist Jacob Viner acknowledged in 1925 that “Changes in 
the relative distribution of income as between different classes will bring about changes in the 
amount of welfare, even though the aggregate real income of the community remains the 
same.”155  Within this framework a social welfare scheme that transferred wealth away from the 
wealthy and toward the poor increased aggregate welfare to the extent that the wealthy 
experienced less welfare from a given sum of money than the poor did. 
 In the mid-thirties Lord Lionel Robbins exploded this argument in his Essay on the 
Nature and Significance of Economic Science. He argued that the proposition that one person 
experiences the same utility as another from a given amount of wealth was scientifically 
meaningless because it could not be tested.156  In a widely quoted passage Robbins reasoned 
suppose that we differed about the satisfaction derived by A from an income of 1,000 £, 
and the satisfaction derived by B from an income of twice that magnitude. Asking them 
would provide no solution. Supposing they differed. A might urge that he had more 
satisfaction than B at the margin. While B might urge that, on the contrary, he had more 
satisfaction than A. We do not need to be slavish behaviourists to realise that here is no 
scientific evidence. There is no means of testing the magnitude of A's satisfaction as 
compared with B's. If we tested the state of their blood-streams, that would be a test 
of blood, not satisfaction. Introspection does not enable A to discover what is going on in 
B's mind, nor B to discover what is going on in A's. There is no way of comparing the 
satisfactions of different people.157 
Everything that Robbins said in this passage is very likely true.  Nevertheless it did not 
entirely end the debate over interpersonal utility comparisons.  First, Robbins was writing in a 
positivistic tradition obsessed with limitations on scientific inquiry into state of mind.158  He 
simply assumed that the only “scientific” economic inquiry into welfare accordingly concerned 
                                                          
153ALFRED MARSHALL PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 206 (3d ed. 1895.) 
154ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 89 (4th ed. 1932). 
155Jacob Viner, The Utility Concept in Value Theory and Its Critics (pts. 1 & 2), 33 J. POL. ECON. 369, 
638, 644 (1925).  FRANK WILLIAM TAUSSIG, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 132 (3d ed. 1921) (“[I]nequality 
of incomes brings a less sum of human happiness than equality of incomes.”); John Bates Clark, The 
Ultimate Standard of Value, 1 YALE REV. 258, 258 (1893) (discussing the social nature of value); Simon 
N. Patten, The Scope of Political Economy, 2 YALE REV. 264, 265 (1894) (similar). 
156LIONEL ROBBINS, AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE (2d ed. 
1935).  See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note __ at 111-112. 
157 ROBBINS, ESSAY, supra note __ at 139-140. 
158 HOVENKAMP OPENING, supra note __ at 111-112. 
Hovenkamp Marginalism and Regulation  June 2018, Page 28 
 
mental state.  However, if welfare is estimated objectively, by looking at such external factors as 
material wealth, health, education, nutrition, shelter, productivity, or numerous other external 
indicia, then interpersonal comparability is readily possible.  As a matter of government policy 
objective welfare judgments may be superior in any event because they more readily permit 
generalization about large numbers.159 
Second, Robbins’ analysis overlooked the relationship between wealth of various kinds 
and human production functions.  If a transfer from a rich person to a poor person also increases 
productivity by taking wealth from a person for whom it has little marginal impact and giving it 
to someone who becomes much more productive, then the transfer may increase welfare by 
increasing economic growth. 
One effect of the welfarism debate was that for some time it created a sharp divide 
between neoclassical welfare economics and more applied branches of economics, including 
state economic policy making.  The same issue also divided neoclassical welfare economics from 
most of the other social sciences.160  In neoclassical economics textbooks, authors talked about 
wealth transfers as if economics should be indifferent to them.  The real concern of economics 
was said to be allocative efficiency, typically measured by Paretian criteria and the deadweight 
loss caused by monopoly.  By contrast, economic policy during the New Deal and after took the 
distribution of wealth very seriously and developed important governmental programs designed 
to give effect to these concerns.161  Even in public utility law, the goal of universal service for 
such things as electricity and telephone might be viewed as distributive, at least for those 
customers who cannot even pay the variable costs of their service.162 
  Today, it seems safe to say, concerns about distribution have dramatically re-entered the 
picture, although the concerns tend to focus on productivity rather than on Robbins’ states of 
mind.163 
 
                                                          
159 For a more or less contemporary critic on this point, see IAN M.D. LITTLE, A CRITIQUE OF WELFARE 
ECONOMICS (1950). 
160See Herbert Hovenkamp, Knowledge About Welfare: Legal Realism and the Separation of Law and 
Economics, 84 MINN. L. REV. 805 (2000). 
161See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note __ at 112-114. 
162 On the development of the concept, see Herbert S. Dordick, The Origins of Universal Service: History 
as a Determinant of Telecommunications Policy, 14 TELECOMMUNICATIONS POL’Y 223 (1990).  On 
telephone service at prices lower than variable costs, see Milton Mueller, Universal Service in Telephone 
History: A Reconstruction, 18 TELECOMM. POL’Y 352 (1993). 
163E.g., INEQUALITY AND GROWTH: PATTERNS AND POLICY (Kaushik Basu and Joseph E. Stiglitz, eds., 
2016); JONATHAN D. OSTRY, ET AL., REDISTRIBUTION, INEQUALITY AND GROWTH (IMF, 2014); Federico 
Cingano, Trends in Income Inequality and its Impact on Economic Growth (OECD working paper, 2014), 
available at https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/5jxrjncwxv6j-
en.pdf?expires=1526298689&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=237F380132F4FA78141554ECACA90
3DD; Sutirtha Bagchi & Jan Svejnar, Does Wealth Inequality Matter for Growth?  The Effect of 
Billionaire Wealth, Income Distribution, and Poverty, 43 J. COMPARATIVE ECON. 505 (2015) 
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Actuarial Conceptions of Value and Risk 
 The marginalist revolution in economics gave us two fundamental shifts in thinking about 
economic value.  One was the relationship between schedules of demand and the various types of 
costs that determine output and price.  This shift accounts for previously discussed issues such as 
cost-of-service ratemaking.164 
 The other shift was in forward rather than backward looking conceptions of value.  That 
shift brought much needed realism to the commercial and legal system.  For example, the 
classical notion that the value of a corporation is determined by the amount of historically 
contributed capital bore no useful relationship to the value of a firm in the eyes of prospective 
shareholders or creditors.165  Indeed, the only date on which a firm could meaningfully be said to 
be worth its paid in value was the day it commenced operations.  After that its value could go 
either up or down, and often in a relatively short period of time.  Some firms that started out with 
little capital became enormous and extravagantly wealthy.  Others, which were much better 
financed to begin with, soon went broke.  It all depended on luck, managerial success, the market 
success of new products or services, and the comparative success or failures of rivals. 
 All of this is to say that while the marginalist theory of corporate valuation was a 
significant improvement, reflecting market realities, it enormously complicated decisions about 
valuation.  In classical corporate finance theory a judge could determine whether stock was 
“watered” – i.e., whether its capital was overstated – by doing a little arithmetic with cash 
payments and slightly more complex valuation with noncash contributions.  But basing the value 
of a firm on its market prospects was much more difficult, because it included risk and 
uncertainty in the calculation,166 as well as a far greater number of variables.  The value of a firm 
became a composite answer to questions about the future value of a firm’s products, its capacity 
to manufacture, various anticipated headwinds in sources of supply and labor relations, the 
anticipated health of its rivals, the value and remaining life of intellectual property portfolios, the 
expected health of the economy overall, and expectations about the national or perhaps world 
physical and regulatory environment. 
In addition, actuarial conceptions of risk, which depend entirely on marginalist tools, 
facilitated significant changes in the theory of firm risk bearing as well as the insurance 
industry.167  The common law itself began to adopt more actuarial, or risk driven, conceptions of 
                                                          
164See discussion supra, text at notes __. 
165 See discussion supra, text at notes __. 
166Under Frank Knight’s terminology a “risk” occurs when the occurrence of a future event is unknown 
but can be calculated as a probability, such as the future toss of dice.  B contrast, “uncertainty” deals with 
the occurrence of future events whose probability cannot be readily calculated.  See FRANK H. KNIGHT, 
RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT (1921); Milton Friedman & L.J. Savage, The Utility Analysis of 
Choices Involving Risk, 56 J. POL. ECON. 279 (1948). 
167A formative text was ALLAN H. WILLETT, ECONOMIC THEORY OF RISK AND INSURANCE (1901).  The 
Casualty Actuarial Society was created in 1914 as a professional association of insurance actuaries.  Then 
Professor, later Justice, William O. Douglas became one of the first legal scholars to write about the 
administration of risk.  See William O. Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk, I & II, 38 
YALE LJ. 584, 720 (1929). 
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legal duties that governed things such as long-term (relational) contracting and the 
implementation of negligence and products liability rules in tort.168 
 These developments began early in the history of marginalist thought and have had 
staggering implications for regulation.  The science of risk management has essentially 
developed into economically sophisticated and technical private and public branches.  Private 
risk management refers mainly to how firms make longer run investment or management 
decisions in the presence of risk. The public branch is devoted mainly to problems of 
externalities or spillovers where government intervention is thought necessary.169  These are 
most likely to occur when one person’s or firm’s activities cause harm to someone else. 
 The balance of this paper focuses on two areas of interest, although there are many, many 
others. 
Marginalism and the Common Law from Holmes to Torts 
 The first marginalist legal scholar in the United States was Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 
who devoted much of his academic writing to risk management and the common law legal 
system.  Much has been written about the influence of Darwin on Holmes’s thought, but much 
less about Holmes’s marginalism, the other Victorian science that certainly had a more 
significant impact on his thinking.170  This was already reflected in Holmes’ lectures published 
as The Common Law (1881).  In his chapter on tort law he wrote that "… the safest way to secure 
care is to throw the risk upon the person who decides what precautions shall be taken."  Further, the 
risk must generally be assigned to the person in control of outcomes. He also defended aggressive 
rules for highly dangerous conduct that "throw the risk upon the party pursuing it."  In contract law 
he argued that contracts should be viewed as "the taking of a risk" and a set of bets about the future.  
Consequential damages were not appropriate "unless the assumption of that risk is to be taken as 
having fairly entered into the contract."171  While Holmes was not an economically technical 
marginalist, many of these ideas eventually worked their way into the law and economics 
movement. 
 Relatedly, Holmes’s external standard became a way of conforming individual activity to 
social norms so as to minimize risk.  The legal system cannot assess states of mind; it can only 
                                                          
168See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note ___, Ch. 7. 
169 On private, or entrepreneurial risk management, see JAMES LAM, ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT: 
FROM INCENTIVES TO CONTROLS (2d Ed. 2014); ROBERT JARROW, THE ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF 
RISK MANAGEMENT: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND APPLICATIONS (2016) (mainly financial).  On 
management of public risks, see the now archived reports of the Environmental Protection Agency, 
Presidential Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk Management, available at 
https://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/risk/recordisplay.cfm?deid=55006.  The Federal Aviation Administration, 
which is in the Department of Transportation, also maintains a website providing information about its 
regulatory activities in the area of aviation safety.  See 
https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/handbooks_manuals/aviation/risk_management/  
170 On Holmes’s marginalism, see HOVENKAMP, OPENING at 38-41. 
171OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW, 117, 149, 300-305 (1881). 
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control behavior.172  For that, Holmes posited the “average” person in “temperament, intellect and 
education”173 as the common law norm.  Conduct that fell below that norm could rightfully be 
condemned as negligent.174 
What Holmes did not fully articulate is that he was turning the “private” common law into a 
social control device.  Holmes worked out the skeleton of a system in which deterrence at the 
margin became the goal of judge made legal policy, with the “average man” as the determinant of 
the standard.  Further, it was forward looking.  Holmes repeatedly emphasized that the operative 
characteristic of his average person was reasonable foresight.  "If the intervening events are of such 
a kind that no foresight could have been expected to look out for them, the defendant is not to blame 
for having failed to do so," Holmes wrote  about proximate cause in tort law.175  Judge Learned 
Hand’s objective cost-benefit test for negligence augmented this by adding marginalist 
quantification to foresight.176  That test – that an action is negligent if the marginal cost of the 
untaken precaution would have been less than the marginal cost of the accident it would have 
prevented (probability X magnitude) -- represented the triumph of pure marginalism in tort law.177  
As one pair of authors articulate the test: 
The marginal Hand rule states that the injurer is negligent if the marginal cost of his or 
her precaution is less than the resulting marginal benefit. Thus, the injurer is liable under 
the Hand rule when further precaution is cost-justified.178 
Today it has become conventional to regard the Carroll Towing rule as requiring a 
comparison of the marginal cost of precautions against the anticipated cost of an accident.  An 
efficient actor, at the margin, equates the two.179  That approach has also been substantially 
                                                          
172E.g., id. at 49 (even criminal law is indifferent to states of mind; rather its purpose is “to induce 
external conformity to rule”); id. at 62-63 (“The charge of malice aforethought in an indictment for 
murder has been shown not to mean a state of the defendant’s mind, as is often thought, except in the 
sense that he knew circumstances which did in fact make his conduct dangerous.”); id. at 136 
(“recklessly” does not mean “actual personal indifference to the truth….”  Rather, “its means only that the 
data for the statement were so far insufficient that a prudent man could not have made it without leading 
to the inference that he was indifferent….  [I]f a man makes his statement on those data, he is liable, 
whatever was the state of his mind.”). 
173Id. at 63, 108, 303. 
174 Id. at 112 (“…when the question of the defendant’s negligence is left to a jury, negligence does not 
mean the actual state of the defendant’s mind, but a failure to act as a prudent man of average intelligence 
would have done….”). 
175Id. at 92.  See Nicholas St. John Green, Proximate and Remote Cause, 4 AM. L. REV. 201 (1870).  See 
HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note _, at Ch. 7. 
176 United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).  See Chapter 7. 
177On the commonly accepted view that the relevant costs are marginal, see WILLIAM M. LANDES AND 
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 87 (1987). 
178ROBERT COOTER AND THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 214-215 (2011). 
179See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES AND RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 
87 (1987); HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note __ ; Allan M. Feldman and Jeonghyun Kim, The Hand 
Rule and United States v. Carrol Towing Co. Reconsidered, 7 Am. L. Econ. Rev. 523 (2005); Robert 
Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: the Model of Precaution, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1985). 
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written into the test for dangerous and defective products given in the Restatement (Third) of 
Products Liability that “… a product is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm 
posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable 
alternative design.”180  This language effectively turns the definition of a dangerous and 
defective products into an exercise in risk management and cost-benefit analysis.  As a common 
law rule, of course, it does not “regulate” in the command and control sense, but rather imposes 
liability after the fact.  However, federal agencies such as the Consumer Product Safety 
Commission (CPSC) operate under the same standard for ex ante product safety requirements.181 
The more salient fact is that this rule, much like the previous risk-utility test used in tort cases, 
incorporates regulatory principles into the common law using marginalist formulations that 
compare the marginal cost of precautions against marginal benefits – in the words of one 
important scholar of products liability, “the level at which the marginal cost of the investment equals 
the marginal cost of product-related accidents thereby avoided.”182 
Innovation Risk and PTAB Patent Review 
 Innovation often requires firms to take on a great deal of cost, risk, and uncertainty.  A 
well designed patent system should manage it effectively.  The consensus is strong that a patent 
system is necessary to facilitate innovation,183 and of course the Constitution expressly 
authorizes its creation.184 The appropriate question is not whether to regulate, but rather how to 
regulate.  If the marginal exclusion created by the patent system is too small, some socially 
valuable inventions will not be created, or perhaps will not be created as early.  On the other 
hand, if the patent system over-excludes, it acts as a clog on the flow of technology.  The trick is 
to find the sweet spot between excessive and inadequate protection.185 
 Considered in isolation, the initial system under which patent applications are evaluated 
and granted suggests significant deficiencies. First, it is largely ex parte, which means that the 
examiner hears almost exclusively from proponents of the patent.186  Second, patent examiners 
                                                          
180RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: PRODUCT LIABILITY §2(b) (1988).  See Aaron D. Twerski and James 
A. Henderson, Jr., Manufacturers’ Liability for Defective Product Designs: the Triumph of Risk-Utility, 
74 BROOK. L. REV. 1061 (2009). 
181See 15 U.S.C. § 2058(f)(2) (2012) (prohibiting the CPSC from promulgating a product safety rule 
““unless it has prepared . . .a final regulatory analysis of the rule containing . . . [a] description of the 
potential benefits and potential costs of the rule….”).  See Zen Magnets, LLC v. Consumer Product Safety 
Commisson, 841 F.3d 1141 (10th Cir. 2016) (disapproving a CPSC rule where cost-benefit analysis was 
unsupported). 
182James A. Henderson, Jr., Product Liability and the Passage of Time: the Imprisonment of Corporate 
Rationality, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765, 765 (1983). 
183Strong, but not unanimous.  For one of the exceptions, see MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, 
AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY (2010) (arguing that patent and copyright be largely abolished). 
184 U.S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 8. 
185 See CHRISTINA BOHANNAN AND HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT: 
PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION, Chs. 2-3 (2015). 
186See, e.g., Lee Petherbridge et al., The Federal Circuit and Inequitable Conduct: An Empirical 
Assessment, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1296 (2011) (linking ex parte nature of patent prosecution to need 
for an inequitable conduct defense). 
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do not have the time or resources to give each patent application adequate consideration.  On 
average a patent receives eighteen or fewer hours of examination.187 The average number of 
claims in a patent hovers at around 16-18,188 which suggests that examiners spend about an hour 
per claim evaluating patents, disregarding the time they need to spend on other portions of the 
patent application.  As a result too many invalid patents are granted.  When patent validity is 
litigated in an adversarial setting, where considerably more resources are put into the analysis, as 
many as 60% or even more of these already issued patents are found completely or partially 
invalid.189 
 Invalidity rates are only a part of the problem.  In addition, a very large number of legally 
valid patents have no economic value.  They may be perfectly valid as a matter of patent law, but 
they are worthless because there is no market for them.  The technologies they invent may be too 
costly in relation to what they provide.  There may be better methods for doing the same thing.  
They may be solutions in search of a problem.  In any event, more than 90% of issued patents are 
never licensed, and of these a high percentage are never commercialized at all.190  Only 1-3% of 
issued patents are ever litigated, and the rate has been declining, which is consistent with the 
proposition that the commercial value of issued patents (aside from validity questions) is 
declining as well.191  Further, patent litigation is very expensive, ranging from $600k where less 
than $1m is at risk, to approximately $5m when the amount at risk exceeds $25m.192 
                                                          
187See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the United States Patent System, 
82 B.U. L. REV. 77, 135 (2002); Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1495, 1500 (2001).  See also Janet Freilich, Patent Clutter, 103 IOWA L. REV. 925 (2018); Roger 
Allan Ford, The Patent Spiral, 164 U. PA., L. REV. 827 (2016); Brenda Sandburg, Speed Over 
Substance?, INTELL. PROP. MAG., Mar. 1999; John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the 
Patent System: A Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 316-22.  And see Michael D. 
Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Is the Time Allocated to Review Patent Applications Inducing 
Examiners to Grant Invalid Patents? Evidence from Microlevel Application Data, 99 REV. ECON. & 
STAT. 550 & app. tbl.A1 (2017). 
188For recent data, see https://patentlyo.com/patent/2017/10/standard-patent-size.html.  
189See Ronald J. Mann, A New Look at Patent Quality: Relating Patent Prosecution to Validity, 9 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1 (2012) (looking at Federal Circuit decisions, 59.8% found invalid).   Other 
studies largely in accord are John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley, & David L. Schwartz, Understanding the 
Realities of Modern Patent Litigation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1769, 1777-1779 (2014).  This study updates John 
R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 
185, 188-93 (1998).  See also Paul M. Janicke & Lilan Ren, Who Wins Patent Infringement Cases, 34 
AIPLA Q.J. 1 (2006) (breaking down data by technology, identify of inventors and accused infringers and 
law firms).  See also Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Resilience of the Patent System, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1 
(2016). 
190See Daniel Fisher, The Real Patent Crisis is Stifling Innovation, FORBES (Jun 18, 2014).  For a more 
detailed breakdown of the data, see Ron D. Katznelson, A Century of Patent Litigation in Perspective 
(SSRN, rev. July 31, 2018), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2503140.  
191See Katznelson, id. And see Hannibal Travis, Counter-IP Conspiracies: Patent Alienability and the 
Sherman Antitrust Act, 71 UNIV. MIAMI L. REV. 758, 762 & . 13 (2017). 
192 See AIPLA Survey of Costs of Patent Litigation and Inter Partes Review (Jan. 30, 2017) (summarized 
in PatentAttorney.com, available at https://www.patentattorney.com/aipla-survey-of-costs-of-patent-
litigation-and-inter-partes-review/). 
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While patent examiners are trained to consider questions of legal validity, they do not 
generally consider commercial value or success, except in obvious cases of patents that clearly 
do not work or are useless on their face.193  One can only imagine, but requiring examiners to test 
unissued patents for commercial value would increase examination costs enormously, even 
assuming they were capable of doing it.  The best way to test commercial, as opposed to legal, 
value is through the market.  A legally valid patent is commercially valuable if at least one firm 
wants to license it or produce technology or processes that infringe it. 
 A rational system for optimizing patent issuance must be responsive to concerns about 
both invalidity and economic value.  Further, it must make these evaluations at reasonable cost.  
The patent examining process assesses legal validity, but economic value is best assessed by the 
relevant parties’ willingness to put resources into validity determinations.  If a patent is 
economically worthless it is unlikely that people will object to it or dispute its validity, because it 
does not interfere with their business. 
In its 2018 Oil States decision the Supreme Court approved a sensible regulatory 
approach to the system that assesses the legal validity of patents prior to litigation.194  The 
challenged administrative process, called inter partes review,195 permits any person to ask the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to reconsider and, if necessary, cancel one 
or more claims in an issued patent.196  The procedure is administrative but adversarial.  Both the 
patentee and the challenger have participation rights, including the right to present evidence, 
make arguments, and have a hearing before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB).197  This 
makes the process significantly different and more demanding than the type of ex parte 
examination that goes on during initial patent prosecution.  However, it is also much less costly 
than patent infringement litigation in a federal court.  Most particularly, PTAB review is limited 
to questions of validity under §§102 and 103 of the Patent Act; it does not consider infringement.  
The PTAB decision is fully reviewable on appeal to the Federal Circuit in which both the 
patentee and the challenger are entitled to be parties, as well as PTAB itself.198 
The PTAB proceeding permits the Agency to do a much more thorough and yet relatively 
low cost review of patent validity.199 The costs of administrative inter partes review are 
dramatically lower than the cost of litigation, running around $275k through a PTAB hearing and 
$350k through appeal.200 One Amicus in Oil States estimated the cost differential between 
                                                          
193 For good perspective, see Michael Risch, Reinventing Usefulness, 2010 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1195; Sean B. 
Seymore, Making Patents Useful, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1046 (2014). 
194 Oil States Energy Svces, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC, 138 S.Ct. 1365 (2018). 
195Created in the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. §100 et seq.  See id. at 1371. 
19635 U.S.C. §§311-319. 
197 The process is briefly laid out in Oil States, 138 S.Ct. at 1371-1372. 
198See 35 U.S.C. §319; and Oil States, 138 S.Ct. at ___ (describing the appeals procedure). 
199Accord Carl Shapiro, Patent Reform: Aligning Reward and Contribution, in 7 INNOVATION POLICY 
AND THE ECONOMY (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2007).  See also Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro, How 
Strong are Weak Patents, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 1347 (2008) (arguing that it would be efficient to create a 
process that determines patent validity prior to licensing. 
200AIPLA Survey, supra note __. 
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litigation and inter partes review as exceeding ten to one.201  Importantly, however, the costs are 
not zero, and as a result someone must have a financial incentive to challenge a patent.  Most 
likely, this is someone producing technology that arguably infringes the patent in question, 
assuming it is valid.  That is to say, patents that are challenged in a PTAB inter partes proceeding 
very likely do have positive commercial value, assuming they are valid, or no one would bother 
to challenge them. 
 Some critics of this administrative inter partes review system lament that it undermines a 
“strong patent system.”202  That is an odd use of terminology, in which “strong patent system” 
actually becomes a synonym for protection of weak patents.  It is as if a military general who, 
upon being instructed to raise a strong army, responded by abolishing or downgrading 
requirements for physical and mental fitness.  That might produce a lot of soldiers, but not likely 
a stronger army.  You don’t protect a strong patent system by approving lots of weak patents, but 
rather by coming up with a rational, cost-effective system for distinguishing those patents that 
make the requisite contribution to technological progress from those that do not. 
 The two stage patent evaluation system that inter partes review permits is an efficient 
application of the economics of information.  In George Stigler’s words, “the optimum amount 
of search will be such that the marginal cost of search equals the expected increase in 
receipts….”203 At the initial grant stage relatively few resources are committed to establishing 
validity – a rational decision given that so many patents are commercially worthless anyway.   
While the error rate is high, the likelihood that anyone will be harmed is relatively low.204 Once 
their commercial value has been declared via a PTAB validity challenge, however, the stakes 
have gone up and a more costly examination is called for.  One additional likely effect is that in 
the residual patent infringement cases in the district courts a relatively higher percentage of 
resources will go to questions of infringement, including claim construction, rather than validity.  
Questions of infringement typically do not second guess the patent issuance process.  Rather, 
they accept the patentee’s claims as given and consider the scope of the accused device or 
process. 
                                                          
201Brief for Apple, Inc., as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Oil States, 2017 WL 4946906 (Oct. 
30, 2017) 
202 E.g., Brief of University of New Mexico as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Oil States, 2017 
WL 3888211 (U.S.S.Ct. Aug. 31, 2017) (equating elimination of inter partes review with protection of a 
“strong patent system”); James Carmichael & Brad Close, Despite Oil States, Inter Partes Review May 
Still be Held Unconstitutional, IPWatchdog (April 25, 2018), available at 
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/04/25/despite-oil-states-inter-partes-review-may-still-be-held-
unconstitutional/id=96406/ (similar) Gene Quinn, Predicting Oil States in Advance of SCOTUS Oral 
Arguments, IPWatchdog (Nov. 12, 2017) (identifying abolition of inter partes review as protecting a 
“strong patent system”), available at http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/11/12/predicting-oil-states-
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The patent system, including inter partes review before  PTAB, is intended to manage 
both the very considerable social risk and cost attending innovation as well as its private costs.  
As with so many marginalist institutions, its job is to thread the needle between a policy that 
properly incentivizes useful and worthwhile technology while leaving the channels open for 
other development.  An overly aggressive patent system is bad for the dissemination of 
technological progress just as much as an underdeterrent one. 
Conclusion 
 In our current era in which agency review is under attack it is worth considering exactly 
what we would have to do to roll the clock back.  While this paper does not prove the point, it 
does suggest that returning to a world in which generalist judges are responsible for devising and 
executing regulatory policy will require nothing less than reversing the marginalist revolution 
itself. 
 
